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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
29 April 1963**

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Israeli Readiness Posture

1. We have noted a number of signs of military readiness on the part of the Israelis, but these appear to be essentially of a contingency nature--similar to those undertaken during recent periods of extreme border tension, and much more limited than those which preceded the Israeli jump-off into Sinai in 1956.
2. US embassy officials have seen no evidence that there has been a call-up of Israeli reserves, even on the limited scale noted during the Syrian-Israeli border clashes last fall. However, the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem has observed that the Israelis have strengthened their forces in that area by moving paratroops into the city.

4. It should be emphasized, nonetheless, that the Israeli forces have the capability to move quickly in a limited operation such as occupation of Jordan's West Bank area. We might have a few hours warning; we might have even less. Our attaches in Israel speculate that if the Israelis were to decide to seize the commanding heights of the West Bank on one night, they could carry out the operation the next night. They probably would strike initially with three or four brigades (10-12,000 troops) of which about 1,000 would be paratroops. The attaches are of the opinion that the relatively modest concentration required for this first strike might not be detected by foreign observers. Once the initial objectives had been taken by surprise, rapid mobilization for

DIA review(s) completed.

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the mopping-up operation and probable onward advance to the Jordan River would be affected.

5. We believe, however, that the Israelis would be unlikely to make a preventive attack under present circumstances until they were convinced that the situation in Jordan had so deteriorated as to be beyond retrieval by Husayn's regime.

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